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Abstract Anonymization-based privacy protection ensures
that data cannot be traced to an individual. To this end, an
anonymizer faces two challenges. First, the output anony-
mization must satisfy the underlying privacy definition and
second, the anonymization needs to contain as much infor-
mation as possible. One way to address the latter challenge
has been to introduce flexibility in value generalizations by
enlarging the output domain of the algorithms. This paper
presents the most flexible way of releasing generalizations
by introducing the family of PDF generalizations. In a PDF
generalization, each generalized data value is empowered
by probability distribution functions. Such distribution func-
tions capture more statistics on data, thus enable the pub-
lisher to have better control over the trade-off between pri-
vacy and utilization. We evaluate the PDF approach for `-
diversity and δ -presence privacy models and show how to
convert a `-diverse or δ -present anonymization to a PDF
generalization of higher utility without violating the privacy
constraints. Data mining experiments on real world data show
that information gained from PDFs increases the utility of
the anonymizations.
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The tension between the value of publishing personal data
and concern over individual privacy, is ever-increasing. Sim-
ply removing uniquely identifying information (SSN, name)
from data is not sufficient to prevent identification because
partially identifying information (quasi-identifiers or QI at-
tributes such as age, gender . . . ) can still be mapped to indi-
viduals by using external knowledge [24].
Table anonymization is one method used to prevent iden-
tification. Many different privacy notions that make use of
anonymization have been introduced for different adversary
models. Among these models, k-Anonymity [20,21], `-di-
versity [13], t-closeness [11], (α,k)-anonymity [26], anat-
omization [27] protects sensitive information while δ -pres-
ence [15] protects the existence of individuals in shared data-
sets. Privacy preserving algorithms working on these models
applied different generalization techniques (replacing data
values with more general values) over data cells to satisfy
privacy constraints. DGH based generalization technique
used in [23,6,9,4,18,16,3] requires user specified domain
generalization hierarchies (DGHs or taxonomy trees) to carry
out generalizations. DGHs are tree structures defined over
each attribute domain and are used to specify to what value
a given data value can generalize (in Figure 1, Peru can be
generalized to America or *). Moreover, works in [2,10] as-
sumed a total order between the values of each attribute do-
main and used interval based generalizations which are more
flexible (using the total ordering in Figure 1, Peru can be
generalized to a range such as [Canada,USA] since Canada
≤ Peru ≤ USA). Later in [16], NDGH based generaliza-
tions (generalization through Natural Domain Generaliza-
tion Hierarchies) were introduced where data values can be
replaced with any set of values from the associated domain
to provide even more flexibility in generalizations (Peru can
be generalized to a set such as {Peru,USA}). in Tables 2 and
21 we show example anonymizations of dataset T ; T ∗d , T
∗
i ,
and T ∗n that make use of DGH, interval, and NDGH gener-
alizations respectively. In Section 2, we briefly explain the
previously proposed methods and some of the privacy mod-
els that we will be referring to in future sections.
The motivation behind the current trend towards flexi-
bility is achieving utility. As the released dataset is required
to conform to the underlying privacy requirements, it is also
expected to contain as much information as possible. Intro-
ducing further flexibility in generalizations has the potential
to increase the utility of the anonymizations while still sat-
isfying the underlying privacy metric. As an example, con-
sider the `-diversity privacy metric. `-Diversity requires that
the probability that an individual will be mapped to a sensi-
tive value, given the set of his/her quasi-identifiers, is at most
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or T ∗n are all valid 1.33-diverse anonymizations of dataset
T . However, T ∗n that benefits from the flexible NDGH based
generalizations contains more specific data values thus is
more utilized than the others at the same privacy level `.
However, even NDGH based generalization, being the
most flexible solution offered so far, has still limitations in
expressing generalized information. From the point of view
of a third party, a data cell with value {Peru, USA} is equally
likely to be Peru or USA. However, in many cases, supply-
ing the data cells with probability distribution information
regarding how likely the data cell takes each specific value
gives the publisher more control over the trade-off between
privacy and utility. In this paper, we present a new gener-
alization type, generalizations with probability distributions
(PDF generalizations) in which NDGH generalizations are
empowered with probability distribution functions. In a PDF
anonymization, a data value, say ‘Peru’, can be generalized
to a value {Peru:0.8,USA:0.2} which implies that data cell
is Peru with 0.8 probability and USA with 0.2 probability.
T ∗p , and T ∗p2 in Table 6 are two examples for PDF anonymi-
zations. Such generalizations can be used to better reflect
the distribution of the original dataset. More importantly,
PDF functions can be set according to different privacy con-
straints and thus produce anonymizations of variable utiliza-
tion. In Section 3, we formally define PDF generalizations.
The definition subsumes the previous generalization types.
We next evaluate the effects of PDF generalizations on both
utility and privacy. However, such evaluation of PDF gen-
eralizations makes sense only when we assume a privacy
model such as k-anonymity, `-diversity, t-closeness, or δ -
presence. So our evaluation of utility and privacy will be
separate for each privacy definition.
For privacy techniques that apply generalizations on quasi-
identifiers (k-anonymity, `-diversity, t-closeness, or δ -pres-
ence), the impact of more flexible generalization types (such
as PDFs) on utilization can be observed explicitly through
statistical measures. In this work, as a utility metric, we use
the KL cost metric [8] which is based on the KL divergence
distance between the tuple distributions in the released data
and the original data. In Section 4, we formally state why
KL cost metric is a good measure of utility in our domain.
We also show how to set PDF distributions in a given anony-
mization in order to minimize the KL cost (thus maximize
utility).
For privacy models in which the existence of individuals
in the released datasets is already known by the adversaries
(e.g., k-anonymity, `-diversity, t-closeness, · · · ), the use of
more flexible generalization types does not introduce any
privacy violation [16,12]. More specifically, if an NDGH
anonymization is `-diverse, then any other PDF anonymiza-
tion with the same grouping of tuples is also `-diverse (e.g.,






p , and T
∗
p2 are all
1.33-diverse.) This implies that in terms of privacy, there is
no shortcoming of using a more flexible generalization type
such as PDF generalizations. Thus in these privacy models,
utilization gained by PDFs can always be maximized and
the output of any anonymization algorithm can trivially be
post processed to return a more utilized PDF anonymization.
However, there already exists privacy techniques that better
utilize the quasi-identifier attributes while conforming to the
same privacy requirements [27,29]. Thus, we discuss PDFs
with respect to such models only to evaluate the relation be-
tween PDFs, KL cost, and utilization.
For those privacy metrics in which the existence of indi-
viduals in the released data is inherently sensitive, switch-
ing to a more flexible generalization type might result in
privacy loss. As an example, consider the privacy metric δ -
presence which ensures that the probability that an individ-
ual exists in the released anonymization (existence proba-
bility) is bounded by the δ parameter. Again consider the
DGH anonymization T ∗d and the PDF anonymization T
∗
p of
the same dataset T in Tables 3, 4 and 6. Even though the
groupings of the tuples are the same, the existence prob-
ability of a student is higher in T ∗p since tuples are more
likely to represent students in T ∗p . Thus, for a better anal-
ysis of PDF generalization type in terms of utilization and
privacy loss, in Section 5, we use the δ -presence privacy
constraints. We show how to check for the δ -presence prop-
erty when non-uniform distributions are used for data cells
and show how to post process output of the optimal single
dimensional δ -presence algorithm, SPALM [15], to make
use of PDF generalizations. We present the PDF algorithm,
PPALM, which is not optimal with respect to its domain but
shows how PDFs can be used, even in a probabilistic ad-
versary model, to increase utilization without violating the
underlying privacy constraints.
In Section 6, we evaluate the effect of the new approach
on the utilization of the output dataset. We present rule min-
ing and classification results on real world data and show
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Fig. 1 DGH structures for T ∗d and total ordering for T
∗
i in Table 2
reduce rule mining and classification error on anonymized
datasets without violating the privacy constraints of `-diversity
and δ -presence.
2 Preliminary
2.1 Background and Notation
Given a dataset (table) T with size R and number of dimen-
sions C, T [c][r] refers to the value of column c, row r of T
with c ∈ [1,C] and r ∈ [1,R]. T [c] refers to the projection of
column c on T .
Generalization of a single value v involves replacing v
with a more general value v∗ such that v∗ implies v and pos-
sibly other values from the same domain. Many different
ways to generalize a given value have been proposed. We
now define DGH, interval and NDGH generalizations.
Definition 1 (Generalization Function) Given a data value
v, a generalization function ψ returns the set of all general-
izations of v.
We will name the DGH generalization function as ψd ,
interval generalization function as ψi, and the NDGH gen-
eralization function as ψn
Definition 2 (Table Generalization) Given two tables T
and T ∗, we say T ∗ is a generalization of T with respect to a
given set of attributes QI if and only if |T ∗|= |T | and records
in T , T ∗ can be ordered in such a way that for every possible
index j, T ∗[i][ j] ∈ ψ(T [i][ j]) if i ∈ QI and T ∗[i][ j] = T [i][ j]
otherwise. We say tuple t = T [.][ j] is linked to tuple t∗ =
T ∗[.][ j] and write (t ∈ T )
 (t∗ ∈ T ∗).
In Table 2, all datasets are generalizations of table T
given QI={Sex, Job, Nation}. For each table, a generaliza-
tion function is defined according to the generalization type
being used. According to DGH structures given in Figure 1;
ψd(USA) = {USA, America, *}. T ∗d in Table 2 shows an ex-
ample DGH based anonymization of T . According to the to-
tal ordering given in Figure 1;ψi(USA)= {[vmin,vmax] | vmin ∈
{Canada,Peru,USA}∧vmax ∈ {USA,Britain,France,Italy}}.
T ∗i in Table 2 shows one interval based anonymization of T
according to the same total ordering.ψn(USA)= {Sv | {USA}
⊆ Sv⊆{Canada, Peru, USA, Britain, France, Italy}}. NDGH
based anonymizations are the most flexible anonymizations
proposed so far. T ∗n in Table 2 shows one NDGH based
anonymization of T . Tables T ∗d , T
∗
i , and T
∗
n have the same
grouping of tuples however the generalization type being
used enables T ∗n to contain more specific values compared
to other tables.
Work in [12] presents three more generalization types,
however NDGH still stands as the most flexible. Due to lim-
ited space, we do not include the discussion on these and
assume NDGH as the baseline for the evaluations in coming
sections unless noted otherwise.
While publishing person specific sensitive data, remov-
ing only uniquely identifying information (SSN, name) from
data has been shown to be insufficient to prevent identifi-
cation. An adversary can still map partially identifying in-
formation, quasi-identifiers, (age, gender, · · · ) to individuals
by using external knowledge. E.g., in Table 1, the Salary
attribute of private table T can be considered as sensitive
attribute. The Sex, Job and Nation attributes are quasi-iden-
tifiers (QIT ) since they can be used to identify an individual
in the public table PT . Releasing T as it is does not prevent
linkage even though it does not contain any uniquely identi-
fying information [24].
In most of the privacy models, the adversary is assumed
to know the QI attributes about an individual from some
public dataset or background knowledge. While releasing
private datasets, we also face two different scenarios accord-
ing to the adversary’s knowledge on the existence of the in-
dividual:
– Existential Certainty: The adversary knows that the in-
dividual is in the private dataset and tries to learn the
sensitive information about the individual in the private
dataset.
– Existential Uncertainty: The adversary does not know
the individual is or is not in the private dataset (T ∈ PT ).
Disclosure of existence or absence of an individual in
the private dataset is a privacy violation. (In this case,
there need not even be sensitive attributes in the private
dataset; e.g., releasing data about diabetic patients.)
`-Diversity [13] and its variants [11,19,26] provide pri-
vacy protection for the existential certainty model by limit-
ing the linking of a sensitive value to a specific individual.
In this paper, we will be covering the naive version of `-
diversity:
Definition 3 (Equivalence Class) The equivalence class of
tuple t in dataset T ∗ is the set of all tuples in T ∗ with identi-
cal quasi-identifiers to t.
The equivalence class of row1 in the anonymized data-
sets is the set {row1, row2, row3, row4}.
4Table 1 `-Diversity Framework: Public and Private Datasets. Private dataset has the same size as the Public dataset.
PT :Public Dataset
Name Sex Job Nation
Chris M Student Canada
Luke M Student USA
Darth M Student USA
George M Prof. USA
Padme F Showman Italy
Laila F Singer Italy
Kim F Singer Italy
Ann F Teacher Britain
T :Private Dataset
Sex Job Nation Salary
M Student Canada ≤ 50K
M Student USA ≤ 50K
M Student USA ≤ 50K
M Prof. USA > 50K
F Showman Italy > 50K
F Singer Italy > 50K
F Singer Italy > 50K
F Teacher Britain ≤ 50K
Table 2 1.33 diverse generalizations of T in Table 1
T ∗d :DGH-anonymized Dataset
Sex Job Nation Salary
M * America ≤ 50K
M * America ≤ 50K
M * America ≤ 50K
M * America > 50K
F * Europe > 50K
F * Europe > 50K
F * Europe > 50K
F * Europe ≤ 50K
T ∗i :Interval-anonymized Dataset
Sex Job Nation Salary
M [Pr,St] [Ca,US] ≤ 50K
M [Pr,St] [Ca,US] ≤ 50K
M [Pr,St] [Ca,US] ≤ 50K
M [Pr,St] [Ca,US] > 50K
F [Te,Si] [Br,It] > 50K
F [Te,Si] [Br,It] > 50K
F [Te,Si] [Br,It] > 50K
F [Te,Si] [Br,It] ≤ 50K
T ∗n :NDGH-anonymized Dataset
Sex Job Nation Salary
M {Pr,St} {Ca,US} ≤ 50K
M {Pr,St} {Ca,US} ≤ 50K
M {Pr,St} {Ca,US} ≤ 50K
M {Pr,St} {Ca,US} > 50K
F {Te,Sh,Si} {Br,It} > 50K
F {Te,Sh,Si} {Br,It} > 50K
F {Te,Sh,Si} {Br,It} > 50K
F {Te,Sh,Si} {Br,It} ≤ 50K
Table 3 δ -Presence Framework: Public and Private Datasets. Individuals in Private dataset is a subset of that of the Public dataset. Attribute “Ext”
is not part of the public dataset but specifies which tuples are in the private dataset.
PT :Public Dataset
Name Sex Job Nation Ext
Chris M Student Canada 1
Luke M Student USA 1
Darth M Student USA 1
George M Prof. USA 1
Obi M Prof Canada 0
Padme F Showman Italy 1
Laila F Singer Italy 1
Kim F Singer Italy 1
Ann F Teacher Britain 1











Definition 4 (`-Diversity) Let ri be the frequency of the
most frequent sensitive attribute in an equivalence class ECi.
An anonymization T ∗ is `-diverse iff for all equivalence class
ECi ∈ T ∗, we have ri|ECi| ≤
1
` .
Table 1 shows an example for the privacy risk in `-diversity
framework where the adversary knows PT and wants to link
salary information to individuals. Clearly releasing T will
result in sensitive info disclosure. (e.g., Showman Padme
has salary>50K) All datasets given in Table 2, respect 1.33-
diversity. The equivalence class of row1 in the anonymized
datasets is the set {row1, row2, row3, row4}. Three out of
four individuals in this class have a salary >50K. Thus by
seeing one of the 1.33-diverse tables, an adversary can at
best link Padme to the first four tuples and will only have
75% confidence that Padme has a salary >50K.
5Table 4 PT ∗d is a generalization of PT and T
∗
d is a (0,0.80)-present generalizations of T with respect to PT in Table 3. Both generalizations have
the same generalization mapping.
PT ∗d :DGH-anonymized Dataset
Sex Job Nation Ext
M * America 1
M * America 1
M * America 1
M * America 1
M * America 0
F * Europe 1
F * Europe 1
F * Europe 1
F * Europe 1
F * Europe 0
⇒










Another privacy metric, k-anonymity [20,21] provides
(partial) privacy protection for the existential certainty model
by limiting the linking of a record from a set of released
records to a specific individual:
Definition 5 (k-Anonymity) A given table T ∗ is said to sat-
isfy k-anonymity if and only if each combination of values
in T ∗[QIT ∗ ] appears at least k times in T ∗.
k-Anonymity fails to protect privacy when there is not
enough diversity over the sensitive values within a given
equivalence class. Thus, in our evaluations, we stick to `-
diversity as a representative of the class of existential cer-
tainty models. However, the technique of k-anonymization
is still useful especially when the adversary also knows the
underlying anonymization algorithm [25]. We will present a
more detailed discussion on existential certainty models in
Section 3.2.
It should be noted that the use of different generaliza-
tion types does not violate `-diversity definition. This makes
it difficult to evaluate the privacy/utility relations for more
flexible generalization types. Thus we need a probabilistic
privacy notion: δ -Presence is defined in [15] for existential
uncertainty model and introduces a δ metric to evaluate the
probabilistic risk of identifying an individual in a private ta-
ble based on publicly known data:
Definition 6 (δ -Presence) Given an external public table
PT , and a private table T , we say that δ = {δmin,δmax}-
presence holds for a generalization T ∗ of T , if
δmin ≤P(t ∈ T | T ∗,PT )≤ δmax ∀ t ∈ PT
In such a dataset, we say that a tuple t ∈ PT is δ -present in
T ∗. Therefore, P(t ∈ T | T ∗,PT ) should be between δmin
and δmax (the probability that the tuple exists in the private
dataset should be between δmin and δmax).
Table 3 shows an example for the privacy risk in the
δ -presence framework where the adversary knows PT and
wants to identify the tuples in the private dataset T . (At-
tribute ’Ext’ in Tables 3 and 4 is not part of the dataset
but shown for ease in discussion. It basically states if the
corresponding tuple exists in the private dataset. In other
words, information in the private table is shown in the at-
tribute ’Ext’ of the public table.) Dataset T ∗d of Table 4 satis-
fies (δmin,0.8)-presence for any δmin ≤ 0.8. Out of 5 people
{Chris, Luke, Darth, George, Obi}, 4 people are in T ∗d . So
the probability that Chris (or any others) is in T ∗d is 0.8. This
is also true for the females.
2.2 Related Work
Besides those mentioned in the previous sections, there has
been other work on releasing more flexible generalizations.
Work in [12] presents three generalization types; in SPS, the
domain of a given attribute is partitioned into distinct groups
and each group can be a generalization of a value inside the
group. SPS is more flexible than interval based and DGH
based generalizations. GSPS takes into account semantic re-
lations among different values and improves SPS by enforc-
ing constraints on the groups. Similarly, GOPS improves in-
terval based generalizations by capturing semantic relation-
ship among values in an attribute domain. As the general-
ization types mentioned in Section 2.1, all these generaliza-
tions imply a uniform distribution over the values in a given
group, thus differ from PDF generalizations that provides
arbitrary distributions.
Works in [27,29] propose an anatomization (also known
as bucketization [29]) approach for existential certainty model.
In anatomy, no QI attribute generalization is done and a
distribution for sensitive values satisfying a given privacy
standard is returned for groups of tuples. It can be shown
that assuming a strict `-diversity framework, anatomization
achieves a higher level of utility at the same level of privacy.
(As an example, in Table 5, we show a 1.33-diverse anato-
mization T a1 which uses the same set of equivalence classes
and which is clearly more utilized than anonymizations T ∗d
and T ∗n .) We postpone a more detailed comparison of anato-
mization and PDF anonymization until Section 3.2.
6Table 5 1.33-Diverse anatomizations of T in Table 1.
T a1
Sex Job Nation Salary
M Student Canada
three ≤50K, one >50KM Student USAM Student USA
M Prof. USA
F Showman Italy
one ≤50K, three >50KF Singer ItalyF Singer Italy
F Teacher Britain
T a2
Sex Job Nation Salary
F Teacher Britain
two ≤50K, two >50KF Singer ItalyM Student USA
M Prof. USA
F Showman Italy
two ≤50K, two >50KF Singer ItalyM Student USA
M Student Canada
Work in [8] proposes publishing marginals (count tables
on quasi identifiers) along with anonymized datasets in or-
der to increase the utility of the anonymization while still
preserving k-anonymity and `-diversity. Their approach is
different from ours in three ways. First, the work is based on
existential certainty model and its extension to existential
uncertainty without sacrificing its utility guarantees is not
trivial (e.g., in Table 3, if an adversary learns that there are
exactly two singers in T , he/she will trivially conclude Laila
and Kim is in T . Certainly some degree of generalization
on the marginals is required. But generalizations on DGHs
do not help here. The adversary can derive the same conclu-
sion if he/she knows that there are three entertainers in T .
Furthermore, one needs to calculate the existence probabili-
ties given the generalized T ∗ and the generalized marginals.
Such an analysis poses challenges similar to the problem be-
ing addressed in this paper.) Second, even if marginals can
be generalized, they still reflect the exact count information
on the values of a given equivalence class, thus do not al-
low one to adjust them to fit into a privacy metric. Third,
it is not easy to extract information from a released ano-
nymization and the corresponding marginal tables, though
as we shall see later in Section 4.1, PDF generalizations
can be treated as fuzzy datasets and previously proposed re-




A PDF generalization is basically a distribution defined over
the associated domain:
Definition 7 (PDF Generalization Function) A PDF gen-
eralization function ψp is a function that, when given a value
v from a categorical attribute domain D = {v1, · · · ,vn}, re-
turns the set of all distributions f defined over D of the form,
{ f | f (vi)≥ 0∧ f (v)> 0∧∑vi∈D f (vi) = 1}.
We write a distribution function f in open form as {v1 :
f (v1), · · · ,vn : f (vn)} and do not write value entries with
zero probability. T ∗p and T ∗p2 in Table 6 shows different PDF
anonymizations of T in Table 1 and 3. We assume for a gen-
eralized value v∗ in a PDF generalization, v∗. f returns the
corresponding distribution function of v∗ (e.g., T ∗p [2][1]={Pr:
0.25, St:0.75}, T ∗p [2][1]. f (Pr) = 0.25). Semantically, a PDF
generalization v∗ represents an atomic value vi with v∗. f (vi)
probability.
PDF generalizations can also be defined over joint at-
tributes:
Definition 8 (Joint PDF Generalization Function) Let Di
be the domain of categorical attribute ai. A joint PDF gener-
alization function ψp is a function that, when given a value
v from D1×·· ·×Dm = {v1, · · · ,vn} with m> 1, returns the
set of all distributions f defined over D1× ·· ·×Dm of the
form, { f | f (vi)≥ 0∧ f (v)> 0∧∑vi∈D f (vi) = 1}.
In Table 7, we show an example joint PDF defined over
attributes Job and Nation. Even if joint PDF functions are
defined over multiple attributes, from a technical point of
view, they are no different than a non-joint PDF function
defined over an attribute with a large domain. Thus, with-
out loss of generality, we assume all PDFs are non-joint and
are defined over single attributes unless otherwise noted. We
discuss joint PDFs in more detail in Section 5.5.
NDGH (and other generalization types) implies uniform
distribution on possible data values the generalized data stands
for. PDF generalizations extend NDGH generalizations with
probability distribution information. This makes the previ-
ous generalizations to be special cases of PDF generaliza-
tions (for a DGH value ’Europe’, corresponding PDF value
is {Br:0.33,Fr:0.33,It:0.33}). The PDF generalization T ∗p (or
T ∗p2) obviously contains more information compared to the
DGH generalization T ∗n . In coming sections, we investigate
how the extra distribution information can be exploited for
the sake of data utilization.
3.2 Use of PDF Generalization in Privacy Metrics
We emphasize that by proposing PDF generalizations, we do
not define a privacy policy but merely provide an alternative
7Table 6 PDF generalizations of T in Tables 1 and 3. Tables serve as examples for both `-diversity and δ -presence. Attribute Salary is part of the
dataset in the `-diversity framework but not in the δ -presence framework.
T ∗p :PDF-anonymized Dataset
Sex Job Nation Salary
M {Pr:0.25,St:0.75} {Ca:0.25,US:0.75} ≤ 50K
M {Pr:0.25,St:0.75} {Ca:0.25,US:0.75} ≤ 50K
M {Pr:0.25,St:0.75} {Ca:0.25,US:0.75} ≤ 50K
M {Pr:0.25,St:0.75} {Ca:0.25,US:0.75} > 50K
F {Te:0.25,Sh:0.25,Si:0.5} {Br:0.25,It:0.75} > 50K
F {Te:0.25,Sh:0.25,Si:0.5} {Br:0.25,It:0.75} > 50K
F {Te:0.25,Sh:0.25,Si:0.5} {Br:0.25,It:0.75} > 50K
F {Te:0.25,Sh:0.25,Si:0.5} {Br:0.25,It:0.75} ≤ 50K
T ∗p2:PDF-anonymized Dataset
Sex Job Nation Salary
M {Pr:0.40,St:0.60} {Ca:0.40,US:0.60} ≤ 50K
M {Pr:0.40,St:0.60} {Ca:0.40,US:0.60} ≤ 50K
M {Pr:0.40,St:0.60} {Ca:0.40,US:0.60} ≤ 50K
M {Pr:0.40,St:0.60} {Ca:0.40,US:0.60} > 50K
F {Te:0.3,Sh:0.3,Si:0.4} {Br:0.40,It:0.60} > 50K
F {Te:0.3,Sh:0.3,Si:0.4} {Br:0.40,It:0.60} > 50K
F {Te:0.3,Sh:0.3,Si:0.4} {Br:0.40,It:0.60} > 50K
F {Te:0.3,Sh:0.3,Si:0.4} {Br:0.40,It:0.60} ≤ 50K
way for the data publisher to release anonymized data. So
the proposed technique can only be evaluated with respect to
a privacy model. In this section, we give an overview on how
the use of PDF generalizations affects privacy with respect
to previous proposed privacy definitions. Following sections
give a more detailed discussion.
3.2.1 k-Anonymity, `-Diversity, t-Closeness
These privacy models can mostly be considered as existen-
tial certainty models. As mentioned before, for such pri-
vacy models, different use of generalization types do not
affect the amount of privacy provided (against the adver-
saries of existential certainty model mentioned in Section
2.1) given that the same grouping of tuples is used and the
tuples in each equivalence class are indistinguishable [16,




n of Table 2, the first and the last 4 tuples
are indistinguishable and the set of sensitive values is the
same. This is also the case in T ∗p and T ∗p2 in Table 6. Thus,
all tables satisfy the `-diversity constraint at the same pri-
vacy level `.
However, as mentioned before, if the sole purpose is
maximizing utility, there is a better alternative to PDF gen-
eralizations. In fact, assuming total existential certainty, re-
leasing anatomization of datasets is a better approach than
releasing PDF generalizations since anatomization better uti-
lizes the QI attributes without disclosing sensitive attributes.
(in Table 5, 1.33-diverse anatomization T a1 which uses the
same set of equivalence classes is more utilized than ano-
nymizations T ∗p and T ∗p2.) However, recent developments on
existential certainty models showed that anatomizations do
not make previous approaches obsolete for two main rea-
sons.
– Compared to anonymizations with the same grouping
criteria, anatomizations are more prone to other forms
of attacks on privacy. Works in [25,28,7] present var-
ious attacks that are empirically proved to be effective
against anatomizations. It is possible but much harder to
employ such attacks on generalizations.
– The grouping of tuples, even when releasing anatomiza-
tions, still affects utility [5]. A grouping where similar
tuples are clustered with each other would produce a
better utilized anatomization when there is correlation
between sensitive and QI attributes. The `-diversity ano-
nymization algorithm optimizing against a utility metric
is a candidate for such grouping. For example, T a1 (with
groups of similar tuples) is surely better utilized than T a2
(e.g., correlation between sex and salary is preserved in
T a1 ). The anatomization process can still benefit from the
use of generalization in capturing the statistical close-
ness of tuples. An optimal (with respect to a cost metric)
PDF anonymization could be used to better form groups
of statistically close tuples.
PDFs can be viewed as an intermediate step between
previous generalization approaches and anatomization. One
can benefit from the flexibility of PDF generalizations to
limit the privacy breaches caused by anatomizations while
achieving a certain level of utility. However, in this paper we
do not propose a grouping algorithm, thus we do not elab-
orate on this issue. In Section 4, we assume an existential
certainty model `-diversity to show the relation between the
8KL cost, utility and PDFs. Doing so greatly eases discus-
sion on utility since the level of privacy (e.g., `) remains the
same through anonymizations with the same set of equiva-
lence classes.
3.2.2 δ -Presence
We can fully benefit from PDFs when we assume an exis-
tential uncertainty model such as δ -presence [15]. In this
case, different PDF anonymizations (even if they use the
same grouping) will provide different privacy levels 1. Con-
sider the PDF anonymizations T ∗p and T ∗p2 in Table 6. Even
though, both anonymizations have the same grouping, the
existence probability for, say a Prof., is higher in T ∗p2. Also
note that anatomization is no longer a good way of releasing
deidentified datasets in a δ -presence framework. E.g., in Ta-
bles 3 and 5, if we release T a, the adversary sees that a male
student from Canada is in T a. As there is no other person
than Chris with these QI attributes, the adversary also con-
cludes that Chris should be in T ;P(Chris ∈ T | PT,T a) =
1.
In a δ -presence setting, selection of PDF probabilities
directly affects not only the utility but also the privacy level.
This property makes δ -presence a perfect candidate to eval-
uate the utility/privacy trade-off when using PDF general-
izations. In Section 5, we show how to calculate existence
probabilities given a PDF anonymizations and a public table.
We also present an algorithm to create PDF anonymizations
that respect δ -presence constraints.
4 PDF and Utilization
As mentioned before, the real advantage of using PDF gen-
eralizations is utility. However, quantifying the utility of a
given anonymization is not an easy problem merely because
utility depends on the target applications that will run on the
anonymizations. Many utility metrics have been proposed
to address various types of applications [6,2,16,8,4]. Work
in [8] presents the first statistical utility metric that is based
on the KL-Divergence between the original dataset and its
anonymization. In this section, we formally define and use
a slightly modified version of this metric, the KL cost met-
ric, to quantify utility. We formally describe why KL cost
is a good choice in our domain and also show how to set
PDF distributions in a given anonymization to minimize the
KL cost. This section discusses only utility. The reader can
assume an existential certainty model such as `-diversity
throughout this section since no matter what PDFs are used,
the privacy level do not change if the grouping of tuples re-
main the same. We postpone the discussion on privacy in
1 For δ -presence, we can define the privacy level as the existence
probabilities of public tuples
existential certainty models until Section 5 when we evalu-
ate PDFs in a δ -presence framework. Discussion on Section
5 benefits from the theorems on utility presented in this sec-
tion.
We begin by describing the methodology we use to pre-
pare the anonymous dataset for any application.
4.1 Data Reconstruction
Many of the anonymizations initially are not suitable for
most data mining applications. The reason is that such ap-
plications assume non overlapping, distinct data cell val-
ues. However for many anonymizations, data value gener-
alizations may imply or intersect with each other. (E.g., for
DGH anonymizations, USA, America, *; all may occur at
the same time as distinct values in a given attribute column.)
So we need a process that will convert the heterogeneous
(multi-level) anonymizations into homogeneous (leaf-level,
atomic) datasets. For this purpose, we adapt the methodol-
ogy proposed in [16] for PDF generalizations. Anonymized
tables are first reconstructed before any data mining appli-
cation is run:
Definition 9 (Reconstruction Function) Reconstruction func-
tion REC is a function that when given some multi-level
PDF anonymized dataset T ∗ respecting a generalization func-
tion ψ , returns an atomic data set of the same size T R (e.g.,
REC(T ∗) = T R), such that
P(T R[c][r] = v) = T ∗[c][r]. f (v)
From now on, we use the notation T Ri for the reconstruc-
tion of T ∗i .
Informally the reconstruction function converts the gen-
eralized data entries to one of their atomic values probabilis-
tically. Probabilistic conversion is done uniformly for DGH,
interval and NDGH generalizations and according to PDF
distributions for PDF generalizations. (For Table 6, T Rp [3][1]
will be US with 0.75 probability. For Table 2, T Rd [3][1] will
be US with 0.33 probability.) The reconstructed data will be
suitable for all data mining applications.
4.2 The KL Cost Utility Metric
Since data mining applications run on reconstructed data,
effectiveness of the application heavily depends on the simi-
larity of the reconstructed data to the original data. Since an
anonymization process does not add any noise, there is al-
ways a non-zero probability that the reconstructed data will
be the same as the original data. We take this matching prob-
ability as the measure of utility in our domain and now for-
mally derive it.
9Let T ∗ be an anonymization with a set of equivalence
classes {EC1, · · · ,EC`}. Also let each ECi has the set of PDF
distribution Fi :
⋃
attribute a fa. We denote the global set of
PDF distributions as GF : {F1, · · · , F` }. (E.g., in Table 6, for
the first equivalence class EC1 in T ∗p F1 : { fSex, fJob, fNation}
where fJob(Pr) = 0.25.) Since each equivalence class is in-
dependent of each other, the matching probability of the
anonymization T ∗ of T is the product of the matching prob-
abilities for each equivalence class in T ∗:
PGF(T ∗) = ∏
ECi∈T ∗
PFi(ECi)
So it is enough to derive the matching probability for
each equivalence class EC independently.
Let cia be the number of times an atomic data value vi
from Da (domain of attribute a) appears in attribute a of EC.
Note that for attribute a, the same distribution fa is used
in all tuples of EC. (E.g., if we assume we have the PDF
anonymization T ∗p of T in Table 3 and the atomic value vi
is USA, then for the first equivalence class, ciNation = 3 and
fNation(vi) = 0.75.) Then we have the following theorems:
Theorem 1 The matching probability for EC is negatively







cia · ln fa(vi) (1)
to which we will refer as the KL cost of EC.
Proof See Appendix A
Equation 1 is nothing but |EC|multiplied with the nega-
tive cross-entropy between the initial value distribution and
value distribution of the given anonymization. This is not
surprising. As discussed in [8], anonymizations maximizing
the negative cross-entropy minimizes KL-divergence with
the original value distribution. Statistically, such an anony-
mization better explains the original data.
4.3 Utility Optimal PDF
We now derive the optimal distribution for a fixed set of
equivalence classes in a given anonymization that will min-
imize KL cost. As mentioned above, we can analyze each
equivalence class EC independently:







for each value vi ∈ Da, minimizes the KL cost, thus maxi-
mizes the matching probability for EC.
Proof See Appendix A
Definition 10 (Utility Optimal) A PDF generalization T ∗
is utility optimal with respect to T and a given set of equiv-
alent classes if probability distribution function for every
equivalence class in T ∗ is defined as in Equation 2.
This means that the utility optimal PDF probability for a
data value v ∈ Da in an equivalence class EC is the number
of times v appears in attribute a of EC divided by the size of
EC. (e.g., weight of v in EC) By definition, utility optimal
anonymizations maximize the matching probability (e.g., In
Tables 3 and 6, T ∗p is utility optimal with respect to T and the
corresponding tuple grouping. The first four tuples contain
1 professor and 3 students, so fjob = {Pr : 0.25,St : 0.75}.)
The next theorem states that matching probability mono-
tonically decreases as each fa gets far away from the utility
optimal distribution;





be the utility optimal distribution and let F(1) and F(2) be
two other distribution functions with | f (1)a(vi)− f (o)a(vi)| ≤
| f (2)a(vi)− f (o)a(vi)| for all attribute a and for all vi ∈ Da
thenPF(1) ≥PF(2) .
Proof See Appendix A
Theorem 3 gives a way to compare PDF generalizations
in terms of utilization. In Tables 2 and 6 matching proba-
bility for T ∗p2 is bigger than that of T
∗
n . This is due to the
fact that distributions in T ∗p2 are closer to those of the utility
optimal T ∗p (for the first equivalence class, fJob(Pr) is 0.25
for T ∗p , 0.4 for T ∗p2 and 0.5 for T
∗
n .) In Section 5, we use this
observation in Theorem 3 to increase utilization in a given
anonymization.
Since all other generalization types assume uniform dis-
tribution on atomic values of a generalized value, (no matter
what the underlying original frequencies of the atomic val-
ues are) it is clear that utility optimal PDF generalizations
simulate original datasets at least as good as the other gen-
eralization types do.
As the reconstructed data becomes similar to the origi-
nal data, all applications run on reconstructed data increase
in accuracy. In Appendix B, we observe the effects of utility
optimal PDF generalizations on data mining applications,
rule mining and classification, by looking at the example
datasets in Table 2. Since the NDGH approach is the most
flexible one among previous generalization types, the com-
parison is carried out between datasets T ∗n and T ∗p from Ta-
bles 2 and 6.
5 PDF and Privacy:δ -Presence
In this section, we switch to a probabilistic existential un-
certainty model, δ -presence [15]. We focus on how privacy
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is affected in a δ -presence environment when PDF general-
izations are used. We introduce a new δ -presence algorithm
WPALM that injects utilization into the datasets without vi-
olating the privacy constraints. We then improve WPALM
in terms of efficiency with a second algorithm, PPALM.
5.1 PDF δ -Presence Algorithms:WPALM & PPALM
In this section, we empower the previously proposed δ -presence
algorithm, SPALM [15], to make use of PDF generaliza-
tions. SPALM, when given a public table PT and private
table T , returns a DGH anonymization T ∗ of T which is
δ -present with respect to PT and T . The PDF algorithms
presented in this section, WPALM and PPALM, both attempt
to increase the utilization of the output anonymization of
SPALM further without violating δ -presence privacy con-
straints (so no privacy loss is encountered). The difference
between two PDF algorithms is covered in the next subsec-
tions, the discussion in this subsection applies for both of the
algorithms. We show experimentally in Section 6 that out-
puts of WPALM and PPALM are better utilized with respect
to KL cost and data mining applications.
Both WPALM and PPALM operate on the SPALM out-
put, which is already δ -present with respect to input data-
sets. Additionally, both WPALM and PPALM shift PDFs
within the output towards utility optimal distribution as long
as the δ -presence property is preserved. The resulting ano-
nymization is obviously not optimal with respect to space of
all possible PDF outputs, but is statistically at least as good
as the SPALM output.
For each equivalence class EC of the SPALM output,
WPALM and PPALM shift the value distributions ( f s), from
uniformity towards utility-optimal distribution step by step.
The maximum number of steps is set by the input variable
mxs. In other words, the distribution of EC becomes utility
optimal in mxs steps, if neither of the intermediate distri-
butions violates δ -presence. For value vi of attribute a in
EC, let f (u) be the initial (uniform) distribution function.
E.g., given that v∗ is the generalized value used in EC ini-
tially, f (u)(vi) = 1|{v | v∗∈ψd(v)}| if v
∗ ∈ ψd(vi) and zero oth-
erwise. Let f (o) be the utility optimal distribution function
(e.g., f (o)(vi) =
cia
|EC| ). Then the distribution function f
(k) be-
ing tried in step k is defined as




In Figure 2, f (u)(‘Europe’)={Italy:.33,Britain:.33,France:
.33}, f (o)(‘Europe’)={Italy:.75,Britain:.25,France:0}. For mxs=
3, f (1)(‘Europe’)= {Italy:.47,Britain:.3,France:.22}, and f (2)
(‘Europe’)= {Italy:.61,Britain:.27,France:.11}. By Theorem













Fig. 2 Shifting the uniform distribution (inherited in data value ‘Eu-
rope’) in T ∗d of Table 2 to the utility optimal distribution in three steps.
of with f ( j) if i> j. So each shift injects utilization into the
anonymization.
In Algorithm 1, we show the pseudocode for the algo-
rithms WPALM and PPALM. The algorithm, in line 2 calls
SPALM to get the optimal DGH δ -present anonymization
of PT , PT ∗ (note that T ∗ ⊂ PT ∗). In lines 4-10, the distri-
bution of each equivalence class of the anonymization are
shifted towards the utility optimal distribution as long as the
presence property is not violated.
The boolean function isPresent is called in line 8 to check
for the presence property. However, checking for the pres-
ence property for non-uniform PDFs is not as simple as in
uniform PDFs (e.g, DGH, interval, NDGH generalizations).
The next two sections cover how the checking process is
carried out for PDF generalizations. WPALM and PPALM
differ in their implementation of isPresent.
Algorithm 1 WPALM and PPALM
Require: public table PT ; private table T , parameter δ , maximum
number of shift steps mxs.
Ensure: return a PDF generalization of T respecting (δmin,δmax)-
presence with KL cost at most that of the optimal full domain gen-
eralization.
1: insert “Ext” attribute into PT according to T as in Table 3.
2: run SPALM on PT , T , and δ , let PT ∗ be the output anonymization
of PT
3: for all equivalence class EC in PT ∗ do
4: k = 1.
5: while k ≤ mxs do
6: update the distribution function of values as f (k) given in
Equation 3.
7: if !isPresent(PT ∗,PT ,δmin,δmax) then
8: undo last updates on EC.
9: go to line 5 to process the next equivalence class.
10: k++.
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5.2 Checking for the δ -Presence Property
We show in this section how to check if a given PDF anony-
mization T ∗ of T is δ -present with respect to a public dataset
PT . We first recall how it is done for uniform distributions.
5.2.1 Checking for Uniform Distributions
For a public dataset PT , private dataset T , and its non-over-
lapping anonymization T ∗ with some generalization map-
ping µ , let PT ∗ be the anonymization of PT with the same
mapping µ . (see Table 4). For uniform and non-overlapping
generalizations, the existence probabilities can simply be
calculated by working on the anonymization PT ∗:
Definition 11 (Projected Set) A set of tuples J ⊂ PT is a
projected set of PT if their generalizations form an equiva-
lence class in PT ∗. We denote tuple j∗ to be their general-
ization in PT ∗ (or in T ∗).
In Tables 3 and 4, given PT ∗d and PT , {Chris,Luke,Darth,
George,Obi} is a projected set with j∗ = <M,*,America>.
In non-overlapping generalizations, the projected sets do not
intersect.
Let J be a projected set in PT and let nσ = |{tuple ji ∈
J | ji[Ext] = σ}| then the existence probability for any ji ∈ J
is given by
P( ji ∈ T | T ∗,PT ) = n1n0+n1
In other words, the existence probability for a tuple is the
number of tuples with Ext=1 over the total number of tu-
ples in the equivalence class. This is because, given T ∗ and
PT , among n0 + n1 = |J| many tuples, n1 of them exists in
T . (Note that n1 is the cardinality of j∗ in T ∗.) Since every
tuple is equally likely to appear in the private dataset, the ex-
istence probabilities are the same for any tuple of the same
projected set.
5.2.2 Checking for Arbitrary Distributions
When we introduce non-uniform probability distributions,
the existence probabilities will be different for each tuple in
a given projected set. An adversary still knows n1 tuples are
selected among |J| tuples but the likelihood of each tuple is
different due to the distribution of the outcome:
Definition 12 (Likelihood Probability) The likelihood prob-
ability for a tuple j ∈ J, written as p j∗j , is the probability
that j ∈ J and j∗ ∈ T ∗ are the same entities. p j∗j =P(( j ∈
PT )
 ( j∗ ∈ T ∗)) =∏i j∗[i]. f ( j[i]).
Given PT of Table 3 and T ∗p of Table 6 J ={Chris,Luke,
Darth,George,Obi} is a projected set with j∗= <M, {Pr:0.25,
St:0.75}, {Ca:0.25,US:0.75}>. The likelihood probability
for Chris (<M,St,US>) is p j
∗
Chris = 1 ·0.75 ·0.25 = 316 .
Definition 13 (Likelihood Set and Existence Set) Let the
set of tuples J = { j1, · · · jn} be a projected set in PT with
respect to some anonymization T ∗. The likelihood set for J
is defined as P = {p1, · · · , pn} where pi = p j
∗
ji . Given a set
S of likelihoods, we use the notation PS for the product of
likelihoods in S (PS =∏
p∈S
p).
The existence set for J contains the existence probabilities
of all tuples in J and thus is defined as EX = {ex1, · · · ,exn}
where exi =P( ji ∈ T | T ∗,PT ).
The likelihood set for J in the example above is P =
{ 316 , 916 , 916 , 316 , 116}.
It is very easy and efficient to create the likelihood set for
a given projected set. Note, however, that we are interested
in the existence set. Given the likelihood set and the number
of existent tuples n1, each element in the existence set can
be calculated one by one. The existence probability for any
tuple jk ∈ J takes the following conditional form:
exk =P( jk ∈ T | T ∗,PT ) = P( jk ∈ T
∧
PT | T ∗)


















In the denominator, set S is a variable traversing all pos-
sible subsets of P having size n1. More precisely, the denom-
inator sums up the probabilities of every possible worlds
(e.g., every possible sets of existing tuples) while numera-
tor sums up only those in which jk is existing (e.g., jk ∈ T ).
Following the above example, the existence probability
for Chris is calculated as






























Similarly, the existence probability for Luke and Darth
is 0.94, for George 0.82 and for Obi 0.47 (EX = {0.82,0.94,
0.94,0.82,0.47} implying this equivalence class respects (0.47,
0.94)-presence). Note that the existence probabilities for the
tuples of the same projected set are not necessarily the same
when releasing PDFs.
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Algorithm 2 isPresent for WPALM
Require: public table PT with attribute Ext; one anonymization of
PT , PT ∗; parameter δ .
Ensure: return true iff PT ∗ satisfies (δmin,δmax)-presence.
1: for all projected set J ∈ PT with respect to PT ∗ do
2: for all tuples j ∈ J do
3: calculate existence probability ex for j as given in Equation
4.
4: if ex≤ δmin then
5: return false
6: if ex≥ δmax then
7: return false
8: return true;
Algorithm 2 shows the implementation of the boolean
function isPresent for WPALM that makes use of Equation
4 to check for the presence property. Basically, the algorithm
calculates the existence probabilities for all tuples and re-
turns true iff all existence probabilities lie within the bound-
aries of presence constraints.
The minimum and the maximum existence probability
in all of the existence sets of PT is sufficient to check for the
presence property. However, calculating the exact existence
probabilities by using Equation 4 is very costly. Many pos-
sible groupings of likelihood probabilities need to be multi-
plied. For a projected set of size m= n0+n1 with n1 present





summations on the denominator. For even mod-
erate values of m (and with n1 ≈ m2 ), calculation of Equation
4 is infeasible even if the likelihood probabilities for the tu-
ples fit into main memory. Next subsection shows how to
weaken this problem by presenting an alternative algorithm.
5.3 Speeding Up the Checking Process
In this section, we improve the δ -presence checking process
in terms of efficiency and introduce the algorithm PPALM
that makes use of the speed up process.
Checking for the δ -presence property can be speed up
by the following observations:
1. The existence probability of only two tuples needs to be
calculated for checking.
2. The calculation of exact existence properties is not needed.
Finding upper and lower bounds on the maximum and
minimum existence probabilities also works given the
bounds are tight enough.
We first show the correctness of item 1. To check for
the δ -presence property, it is sufficient to calculate just the
maximum and minimum existence probabilities in a given
projected set. Theorem 4 states that tuples with maximum
and minimum likelihoods have maximum and minimum ex-
istence probabilities and it is sufficient to check only these
two boundary tuples for δ -presence property.
Theorem 4 Given a likelihood set P = {pmin, pmax, p1, · · · ,
pm} and the number of present tuples n1, let pmin ≤ pi ≤
pmax for i ∈ [1−m]. If exmin ≥ δmin and exmax ≤ δmax then
δmin ≤ ex≤ δmax for any ex ∈ EX.
Proof See Appendix C
Following the example above, Luke and Obi have the
maximum and minimum likelihoods ( 916 ,
1
16 ) respectively.
They also have the maximum and minimum existence prob-
ability (0.94,0.47). So it is sufficient to calculate the proba-
bilities for Luke and Obi.2
We next show the correctness of item 2. The checking
process can be fastened by calculating boundaries on the ex-
istence probabilities rather than calculating the exact proba-
bilities. The lower and upper bound likelihood sets, defined
below, are used to bound the minimum and maximum exis-
tence probabilities:
Definition 14 Given the number of present tuples n1, let
P = {pmin, pmax, p1, · · · , pm} be a likelihood set with pmin <
pi < pmax for all i∈ [1−m]. We say P↓= {(p↓)min,(p↓)max, p↓1,
· · · ,p↓m} is a lower bound likelihood set of P if (p↓)min =
pmin, (p↓)max = pmax, and p↓i = p
max for all i ∈ [1−m].
Similarly P↑ = {(p↑)min,(p↑)max, p↑1, · · · , p↑m} is an up-
per bound likelihood set of P if (p↑)min = pmin, (p↑)max =
pmax, and p↑i = pmin for all i ∈ [1−m].
Following the example above, the lower bound set of
P = { 316 , 916 , 916 , 316 , 116} is P↓ = { 916 , 916 , 916 , 916 , 116} and the
upper bound set is P↑ = { 116 , 916 , 116 , 116 , 116}.
The following theorem states that the lower and upper
bound likelihood sets can be used to check if the original
likelihood set satisfies δ -presence. If the lower and upper
boundary sets satisfy the presence property over one of the
δ constraint, so does the original likelihood set. However,
the reverse is not true.
Theorem 5 Given the number of present tuples n1, the like-
lihood sets P,P↓,P↑, and their corresponding existence sets
EX ,EX↓,EX↑;
δmin ≤ ex ≤ δmax for any ex ∈ EX if δmin ≤ (ex↓)min and
(ex↑)max ≤ δmax.
Proof See Appendix D.
Following the example above, corresponding existence
sets EX↓ = {0.92,0.92,0.92,0.92,0.31}, EX↑ = {0.75,0.97,
0.75,0.75,0.75}. This implies that the original likelihood
set P (and the original projected set) satisfies (0.31,0.97)-
presence. We found earlier that in fact P satisfies (0.47, 0.94)-
presence.
2 If δmin = 0 or δmax = 1, only one tuple needs to be checked as
opposed to two.
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The advantage of working on the boundary sets is that
checking for the presence property is much more efficient
for the boundary sets due to element repetition. Equation 4




) · (p↓)min · ((p↓)max)n1−1(m+1
n1−1
) · (p↓)min · ((p↓)max)n1−1 + (m+1n1 ) · ((p↓)max)n1 (5)
Equation 5 does not require addition of many likelihood
products so it is much faster to compute compared to Equa-
tion 4. However, the boundary sets are useful if the lower
and upper bounds on the existence probabilities are tight
enough. The more each likelihood probability is shifted in
the boundary sets, the more existence probabilities deviate
from the original probability. Observing this, one can use
a trade-off between efficiency and precision on the calcula-
tion of existence probabilities. For the lower boundary set,
instead of shifting likelihoods up until the max likelihood,
we calculate a median as pmed = p
min+pmax
2 and shift like-
lihoods smaller than median to median and the rest to the
maximum likelihood. This would give tighter bounds but
would be slower to compute as we deal with three different
likelihoods instead of two.
Algorithm 3 isPresent for PPALM
Require: public table PT with attribute Ext; one anonymization of
PT , PT ∗; parameter δ .
Ensure: return true iff N∗ satisfies (δmin,δmax)-presence.
1: for all projected set J ∈ PT do
2: let n1 be the number of tuples in J with Ext = 1
3: create the likelihood set P for J
4: create lower and upper bound likelihood sets P↓,P↑ of P.
5: calculate existence probability (ex↓)min [(ex↑)max] for the mini-
mum [maximum] likelihood in P↓ [P↑] with respect to n1
6: if (ex↓)min ≤ δmin then
7: return false
8: if (ex↑)max ≥ δmax then
9: return false
10: return true;
Algorithm 3 shows the implementation of the boolean
function isPresent for PPALM that makes use of the speed
up process. Basically, the algorithm creates upper and lower
bound likelihood sets for the likelihood sets of each pro-
jected set in PT with respect to the anonymization and re-
turns true if and only if bound sets satisfy the partial pres-
ence property.
In Section 6, we show experimentally that both PPALM
and WPALM better utilize the anonymizations compared to
SPALM without violating the presence constraints. We also
compare WPALM and PPALM in terms of efficiency and
utilization. Experiments on real world data show that speed
up techniques given in this section work with great precision
and efficiency in practice.
5.4 Efficiency Analysis
If no pruning can be performed3, the worst-case complexity
of SPALM is O(∏ni=1 Hi · |PT |) where n is the dimensional-
ity of PT and Hi is the height of the ith DGH structure. In ad-
dition to this, WPALM and PPALM does a post processing.
Post processing checks δ -presence mxs ·G many times in
the worst case where G is the number of equivalence classes
PT ∗. The time complexity of the checking process differs
for WPALM and PPALM.
To check for δ -presence, for each equivalence class, WPALM
iterates through all possible combinations of set of existing
tuples. If we assume the sizes of the equivalence classes are
uniform, the size of an equivalence class becomes |PT |G . In
the worst case, half of the tuples will be existing. Thus, as-
suming the unit of operation is one multiplication of all like-
lihoods (e.g., one summand of the denominator in Equation
4), worst case complexity is ω(2
|PT |
2G ). The total complex-
ity of post processing is then ω(mxs ·G ·2 |PT |2G ). Even if this
is an in-memory calculations, |PT | is much bigger than G,
making the post processing infeasible.
For PPALM, checking for δ -presence through Equation
5 takes constant time as we only have two summands. Thus
complexity is O(mxs ·G). However, we also need to cal-
culate binomials of big numbers in this case and the time
needed to calculate binomials dominates multiplication of
the likelihoods.
5.5 Joint PDF Anonymizations
Both WPALM and PPALM return a PDF anonymization
where each data cell is defined in the associated attribute
domain. While doing so is completely privacy preserving,
the joint distribution of attributes cannot be captured by the
parties that can access the PDF anonymization (e.g., T ∗p of
Table 6) but not the public table (e.g., PT of Table 3). Data
publisher can increase utility even more by working on the
joint distributions of attributes and injecting the information
in the public table into the anonymization.
Consider the fifth tuple in T ∗p of Table 6. T ∗p itself im-
plies that the probability that the fifth tuple is a <Te,It> (an
Italian teacher) is 316 . However, there is no such tuple in the
public table PT of Table 3. In other words, T ∗p ,PT together
implies that the fifth tuple cannot be <Te,It>. Parties that
do not have access to PT cannot gain such information.
It is possible for the data releaser to capture joint distri-
butions by combining attributes and return another PDF T ( j)p
on the joint distributions. This can be done by post process-





3 In practice, pruning eliminates majority of the search space.
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Table 7
T ∗p3:Joint PDF Anonymization
Sex Job Nation
M {(St Ca): 316 ,(St US): 916 ,(Pr US): 116 ,(Pr Ca): 316}
M {(St Ca): 316 ,(St US): 916 ,(Pr US): 116 ,(Pr Ca): 316}
M {(St Ca): 316 ,(St US): 916 ,(Pr US): 116 ,(Pr Ca): 316}
M {(St Ca): 316 ,(St US): 916 ,(Pr US): 116 ,(Pr Ca): 316}
F {(Sh It): 310 ,(Si It): 610 ,(Te Br): 110}
F {(Sh It): 310 ,(Si It): 610 ,(Te Br): 110}
F {(Sh It): 310 ,(Si It): 610 ,(Te Br): 110}
F {(Sh It): 310 ,(Si It): 610 ,(Te Br): 110}
be the likelihood of tuple t ∈ PT in T (o)p and T ( j)p respec-











As an example, we show, in Table 7, another PDF ano-
nymization T ∗p3 that returns conditional (conditioned on the
public table) joint distributions. For the second equivalence
class T ∗p , we have three distinct tuples with likelihoods 316 ,
6
16 ,
and 116 . The likelihood of <Te,Br> (thus the PDF probabil-




10 . It can easily be shown that the exis-
tence probabilities remain the same for tuples of the public
dataset. We name this algorithm JPALM (Joint PDF Algo-
rithm) and evaluate its effectiveness in Section 6
Instead of post processing a non-joint PDF, one can also
try to find the joint PDF probabilities directly. Since the
desired output is still a PDF anonymization, the method-
ology for such a process would not be any different than
the methodology given in the previous sections. The result-
ing anonymization is still a PDF anonymization in fewer
dimensions. More specifically, if the intention is to create
a fully joint PDF from a DGH anonymization T ∗d with at-
tributes a1, · · · ,am from domains D1, · · · ,Dm, we start with
another anonymization T ∗j with a single attribute from do-
main D1× ....×Dm. We can apply the same techniques given
in previous sections to create a joint PDF from T ∗j . However,
it should be noted that working in one dimension does not
make the problem any easier. Equations 4 and 5 are inde-
pendent of the dimensionality meaning finding the existence
probabilities in one dimension is as hard as finding them in
many dimensions.
Joint PDFs are superior to attribute based PDFs when
we have all of the following conditions satisfied:
– The public table PT is not known to all parties that want
to make use of the released data and such disclosure of
PT is not a privacy concern. We will further elaborate on
this issue in Section 5.6.2. 4
– The public table is known by the data releaser. There are
applications of δ -presence where only statistical info on
4 One can limit the information disclosure on PT by releasing par-
tial joint PDFs instead. Some attributes can be treated as joint while
others are left as single column PDFs. This would be a trade off be-
tween utility and privacy.
PT (rather than the PT itself) is available to the data
publisher [17].
– The joint PDF anonymization can be stored and man-
aged effectively. This is an issue since the joint domain
of attributes may be quite large to effectively store a joint
PDF anonymization.
Algorithm 4 MPALM
Require: public table PT ; private table T , parameter δ , mSPALM is
minimality attack resistant DGH algorithm.
Ensure: return a PDF generalization of T respecting (δmin,δmax)-
presence that resists minimality attacks.
1: insert “Ext” attribute into PT according to T as in Table 3.
2: run mSPALM on PT , T , and δ , let PT ∗s be the output anonymiza-
tion of PT
3: for all equivalence class EC in PT ∗s do
4: Find the utility optimal distribution with respect to EC and
update the distribution function of values in EC as the utility
optimal distribution.
5.6 Minimality Attack Resistant PDF Generalizations
5.6.1 Algorithm MPALM
Up until now, we assumed that the adversary has access only
to the public table PT . However, it has been shown in [25,
28] that an adversary that also knows the underlying anony-
mization algorithm can perform minimality attacks and learn
more by exploiting the utility optimality (see Appendix E).
We present, in Algorithm 4, a new PDF algorithm, MPALM
and now prove that MPALM is minimality attack resistant.
Theorem 6 MPALM, given in Algorithm 1, is minimality at-
tack resistant.
Proof Let PT ∗p be the output generated by MPALM from
PT ∗s . Let Aalg(PT ∗s ,PT ) represents whatever can be learned
by the adversary from the inputs PT ∗s ,PT and the knowl-
edge of the algorithm. Note that since mSPALM is minimal-
ity resistant, disclosure of Aalg(PT ∗s ,PT ) does not violate δ -
presence. We now prove that Aalg(PT ∗s ,PT )≥Aalg(PT ∗p ,PT )
by looking at the post processing. For each equivalence class
EC ∈ PT ∗s , in line 4, we shift PDFs towards the utility opti-
mal distribution of EC. Now, since we only use the knowl-
edge in PT ∗s and PT to calculate the utility optimal distribu-
tion PT ∗p , PT ∗p can also be calculated from Aalg(PT ∗s ,PT ),
thus Aalg(PT ∗s ,PT )≥ Aalg(PT ∗p ,PT ).
Theorem 6 and its proof state that an adversary that knows
the public dataset PT and the underlying algorithm can sim-
ulate the post processing in the MPALM algorithm. The main
reason for this is that MPALM shifts towards the utility opti-
mal distribution of EC ∈ PT other than equivalence classes
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Table 8 δ -Present anatomization of PT and T
T a1
Sex Job Nation Salary
M Student Canada




4F Singer ItalyF Singer Italy
F Teacher Britain
F Teacher Britain
in the private dataset. This also means such an adversary
does not learn anything other than a minimality resistant out-
put. Those parties that do not know PT learn from the output
of MPALM but cannot conduct minimality attacks without
the knowledge of the whole PT .
As a last note we state that the methodology followed
by [25] can be used to create a presence algorithm that is
minimality resistant. Specifically, a k-anonymization PT k of
the public dataset is found where k is a user input. Most
likely, there will be equivalence classes in PT k that violates
δ -presence. For each such class, the Ext. attribute of the tu-
ples is distorted in such a way that the distribution for the
rate of the existing tuples to non existing tuples is indistin-
guishable from that of the ECs satisfying δ -presence.
5.6.2 Drawbacks of MPALM
While resistant to minimality attacks, algorithm MPALM
has two drawbacks.
First, releasing MPALM anonymizations discloses in-
formation about table PT . This may be a problem in most
applications in which another third party owns PT . While
the use of PT is permitted in such cases, the distribution of
it is generally restricted due to copyrights or privacy regula-
tions. (Both practical examples given in [15,17] fall in this
category. In [15], PT is a voters’ dataset which is sold by
the government. In [17], a hospital releases data about dia-
betics and uses data about all patients as PT .) Fortunately,
information released by MPALM is bounded by first order
statistics. One can also limit the amount of information (with
respect to a utility or privacy metric) by adjusting the PDF
parameters. As long as, we only use information in PT , the
algorithm will remain minimality resistant.
Second, MPALM does not guarantee that the utility of
the released dataset will be increased. Note that MPALM
shifts towards the distribution of ECs in table PT . This does
not necessarily agree with the actual distribution of ECs
in table T . As a simple example, suppose we have, in PT ,
the group of three tuples with a single attribute sex {<F>,
<M>,<M>} and suppose only<F> is present in T . SPALM
would output<*> (or<M:0.5,F:0.5>). MPALM would out-
put <M:0.66, F:0.33> which is statistically further away
from the actual distribution of T (e.g., <M:0,F:1>). On the
other hand, if the existing tuple were <M>, MPALM out-
put would be closer to the original distribution. We show in
Section 6, that the latter is generally the case and MPALM
significantly increases the output of SPALM.
We also want to note that if releasing PT is permitted,
there is another alternative to MPALM. One can use an anat-
omization approach to integrate the whole PT into the re-
leased dataset. The idea is as follows: We run mSPALM as
in Section 5.6.1. We release PT after marking the equiva-
lence classes in PT . We also state for each equivalence class
EC how many tuples in EC are present in T . (see Table 8)
We will name this approach as APALM (Anatomy-based
Presence Algorithm). One can construct a similar proof as
in Theorem 6 to show that the resulting algorithm is also
minimality attack resistant. APALM algorithm has the same
weaknesses as MPALM. In terms of utility, there exists sce-
narios in which using APALM [MPALM] is more effective.
As an example suppose we have, in PT , the set of tuples {<
a1,b1 >,< a1,b2 >,< a2,b1 >} and we have only< a1,b2 >
present in T . The matching probability for APALM, in this
case, is 0.33 (we pick one of the tuples in PT randomly)
whereas the matching probability for MPALM is 0.22, thus
APALM output is more utilized in this case. But if only
< a1,b1 > was present MPALM output would be more uti-
lized with 0.44 probability. We show in Section 6, that there
are cases in which APALM achieves a higher utility level
compared to MPALM.
6 Experiments
In this section, we experimentally evaluate PDF generaliza-
tions. We first experiment with the maximum utilization we
can get from PDFs by assuming an `-diversity framework
and next explore the trade-off between data utilization and
privacy when using PDF algorithms in a δ -presence frame-
work.
6.1 PDF, KL cost, and Utility
This section presents `-diversity experiments to evaluate the
maximum utilization one can get from PDFs. The reason we
perform `-diversity experiments is not to show the superior-
ity of PDFs in terms of utility over previous approaches. As
mentioned before, anatomization approach better preserves
utility in existential certainty. Instead, our objectives are
1. to show the correctness of Theorems 2 and 3 empirically
by presenting the relation between KL cost and PDFs
anonymizations with varying distributions.
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2. to show the correctness of Theorem 1 by experimenting
the relation between KL cost and data mining accuracy.
We tried “real data” experiments by adapting the Adult
dataset 5 and the Census dataset from the UCI Machine Learn-
ing Repository 6. The continuous age columns in both data-
sets were discretized into ten nominal values to facilitate
probability distribution calculations. We used the DGH al-
gorithm Incognito [9] to create `-diverse generalizations. Each
output is then post processed to form the utility optimal PDF
anonymization. while keeping the equivalence classes in-
tact (same process as shown in Tables 1,2, and 6). We also
used two additional PDF generalizations, INTER1 and IN-
TER2, that assigns value distributions between uniform (as
in DGH) and optimal distribution. Both distributions equally
partition the Euclidean distance from uniform to the opti-
mal into three parts. INTER1 is closer to optimal distribu-
tion. More precisely, INTER1 and INTER2 are the two in-
termediate distributions f (2) and f (1) defined in Eqn 3 with
mxs = 3. Note that we proved in Theorem 3 that INTER1
is statistically more utilized than INTER2 and our purpose
now is to show this experimentally. Each anonymization is
reconstructed 5 times with different random seeds before
mining applications are applied on each of them. We present
in the graphs average results of these 5 executions.
We first plot, in Figures 3(a) and 3(b), the KL costs of
the four anonymizations. As stated by Theorem 3, KL cost
decreases as the distribution of PDFs gets close to the utility
optimal distribution in both of the datasets.
We then run association rule mining as a data mining ap-
plication on the reconstructions. From each reconstruction,
we extracted set of rules with support higher than 0.1 and
confidence higher than 0.6. (These thresholds were chosen
so that every output returns at least one frequent rule.)
Figures 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), 3(f) show precision and recall
values of rules mined from anonymizations with respect to
the rules in the original data. As stated in Section 4, the
utility optimal PDF reconstruction with the minimum KL
cost is much closer to the original dataset in terms of rules
supported. As PDF distributions get closer to uniform dis-
tribution, the precision and recall decreases for nearly all
` values. (We also conducted similar experiments for min-
ing class rules. The results were similar, and due to space
constraints, we do not present them here.) This set of exper-
iments explicitly shows that the accuracy in data mining on
anonymizations negatively correlates with the KL cost.
5 available at http://www.ics.uci.edu/~mlearn/
MLRepository.html
6 available at http://www.cse.cuhk.edu.hk/taoyf/paper/
vldb06.html
6.2 PDF for δ -Presence
This section presents experiments regarding privacy - utility
relations when using PDF generalizations in a δ -presence
framework. Six different δ -presence algorithms are com-
pared with respect to utilization of the output anonymiza-
tions and execution time: SPALM, previously proposed δ -
presence algorithm [15]; PPALM, PDF δ -presence algorithm
(Section 5.3); MPALM, minimality attack resistant PDF al-
gorithm (Section 5.6.1), JPALM, joint PDF algorithm (Sec-
tion 5.5); APALM, anatomy-based δ -presence algorithm (Sec-
tion 5.6.2) and WPALM, the weak version of PPALM with-
out the speed up approach (Section 5.2.2). In order to fix
the set of equivalence classes, we used the original SPALM
algorithm as the sub-procedure in MPALM rather than a
minimality attack resistant presence algorithm. Note that all
these algorithms have pros and cons compared to each other
discussed in the corresponding sections.
As mentioned in the previous sections; WPALM, PPALM,
and JPALM try to shift uniform distributions of data values
given in the output of SPALM towards the utility optimal
distributions without violating δ -presence. For these set of
algorithms, we set the maximum number of steps (mxs) to 10
for the experiments. Each shift triggers a check if the pres-
ence property still holds. As described in Section 5.2, the
checking process is very costly for WPALM (time required
by the checking is exponential in the size of the equivalence
classes, see Section 5.2). Thus WPALM has to ignore those
equivalence classes that cannot be handled in a reasonable
time. In our experiments, we ignore the ECs that require
the computation of existence probabilities with more than
5 million combinations. We show, in the coming sections,
that WPALM is still slower than PPALM even with this as-
sumption.
For the experiments in this section, we need a public
dataset PT and a private dataset sampled from T . We use the
diabetes datasets prepared and used in [15] which contain a
public dataset of size 45,222 tuples and a private table of
size 1957. The public dataset is the same as the adult dataset
mentioned above. As a second dataset, we used the Census
dataset as the public dataset. The private tables are created
from the public table based on the statistics taken from [14].
So the private datasets are skewed towards people with sim-
ilar characteristics. Note that due to the rate of the data sizes
δmin < 0.043< δmax needs to hold on the constraints. The δ
parameters were chosen so that the effect of δmin and δmax on
the evaluation is observed. The experiments were designed
to answer the following questions:
1. How effective are the proposed algorithms in terms of
data utilization?
2. How efficient is the proposed PDF algorithms with speed








































































































































































(f) Recall - Census Dataset
Fig. 3 Association Rule Mining Results and KL Costs for `-Diverse PDFs
Table 9 Percentage of dataset processed by WPALM for varying δ
values
.00001 .8 .0001 .8 .001 .8 .01 .8 0 .5 0 .6 0 .7 0 .8
0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 9.4% 9.4% 9.4% 9.4%
6.2.1 The Effectiveness of PDF algorithms in terms of data
utilization
We conducted experiments to compare the output utiliza-
tions of SPALM and PPALM with respect to KL cost metric.
As it was stated in Theorem 1 and in Section 6.1, KL cost
metric is negatively correlated with the matching probability
and the accuracy in rule mining.
Figure 4(a) and 4(b) shows the KL costs of the output
anonymizations for SPALM, APALM, and PDF algorithms
for various δmin & δmax intervals. In both datasets, com-
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(d) Execution Times - Census Dataset
Fig. 4 KL costs and execution times for SPALM, PPALM, MPALM, JPALM, and APALM
PPALM, JPALM, and MPALM introduce a great increase in
utilization by a factor of three at times. MPALM, JPALM,
and APALM that inject the information of PT into released
anonymizations achieve better utility than PPALM. JPALM
achieves the highest utility level. MPALM seems to perform
better than PPALM for strict privacy requirements. Improve-
ment by PPALM, on the other hand, is more observable for
larger δ intervals. The reason for this is that single dimen-
sional assumption for algorithm SPALM is quite inflexible
and often fails to add enough information content into the
output anonymization even when we lower the δ constraints.
This leaves room for PPALM (and consequently JPALM) to
shift PDFs toward the utility optimal distribution, thus inject
utilization into the anonymization. APALM outputs are a bit
less utilized than MPALM with respect to KL-cost, but per-
form better than PPALM outputs for strict privacy require-
ments.
The data mining results given in Figure 5 justify the cost
metric results. The error rates in finding association rules
from output anonymizations generally correlate with the KL
costs of the anonymizations. The only observable exception
is the performance of APALM algorithm in Census Dataset.
APALM output contains more accurate rules with a higher
level of KL-cost compared to MPALM and JPALM algo-
Table 10 Support counts for frequent itemsets. A:marital-
status=Married-civ-spouse, B:sex=Male, C:family-status=Husband,
D:native-country=United-States, E:race=White
Org SP. MP. PP. JP. AP.
A 1121 575 1123 844 1118 1121
AB 1030 528 1031 781 1027 1030
ABC 1024 N/A 1028 469 1020 1025
ABCD 944 N/A 934 242 980 933
ABCDE 854 N/A 852 N/A 838 871
rithms. We want to note that these kind of exceptions are not
unusual. As noted in [16], data mining accuracy depends
also on other factors (e.g., the attributes distorted) and min-
ing accuracy may not always correlate with what a general
purpose utility metric reports.
The support and confidence levels for frequent rules we
found were consistent with Figure 5. As an example, in Ta-
ble 10 we show the support counts of five frequent itemsets
taken from the adult dataset and its anonymizations when
δmin = 0.00001,δmax = 0.8.
Due to large number of tuples not processed, WPALM
did not result in a significant improvement in utility over
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(d) Recall - Census Dataset
Fig. 5 Data mining results for SPALM, PPALM, MPALM, and JPALM
6.2.2 The Efficiency of PDF Algorithms
We conducted a set of experiments to compare the running
times of SPALM, APALM, and the PDF algorithms on a
Core2duo 3GHz Linux computer with 3GB of RAM. The
running times of these algorithms for various δmin & δmax
configurations can be seen in Figures 4(a) and 4(b). As ex-
pected, SPALM is the algorithm with the shortest running
time requirement, since it acts as a subroutine for the other
algorithms. MPALM and APALM requires only one scan of
PT to post-process SPALM output, thus the execution times
for MPALM, APALM, and SPALM are nearly the same.
PPALM requires more time than SPALM due to the post
processing of shifting distribution towards utility optimal.
JPALM post-processes PPALM thus it is the slowest PDF
algorithm proposed in this paper. However, additional time
cost needed for PPALM and JPALM is within acceptable
limits and scales well with the length of the δ intervals.
Even if we do not show in the figures, in most exper-
iments, WPALM requires more execution time compared
to PPALM and this is so despite of the fact that it does
not process most of the ECs. Table 9 shows the percent-
age of the database ignored by WPALM. Majority of the
tuples (90+%) have not been processed. Besides as we force
WPALM to process more equivalence classes, the execution
time becomes intractable. As an example, for the experi-
ment where δ = (0.01,0.8), (in which WPALM seems to be
slightly faster than PPALM) WPALM processes 9 equiva-
lence classes (147 tuples) all of which require around 16000
likelihood multiplications in total. The smallest equivalence
class which is not processed by WPALM is of size 38 tu-
ples with 10 existent tuples. Processing an equivalence class
of this size would cost WPALM to make around 472 million
multiplications. Roughly speaking WPALM would run 1345
times slower to process an additional 0.084% of the whole
data. This is due to the exponential complexity of WPALM
mentioned in Section 5.4.
Even though ideal WPALM acts as an upper bound for
PPALM in terms of utilization, experiments in this section
along with the previous section show that WPALM is too in-
efficient to be practical compared to PPALM. For WPALM
to be as utilized as PPALM, an extremely huge amount of
execution time is required as the number of combinations
that is taken into account during the calculation of existence
probabilities grows exponentially in the size of EC groups.
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(d) Execution Times - Varying no of Attributes
Fig. 6 Scalability of SPALM and PPALM
better utilization. So all of these explicitly demonstrates the
power of the speed-up technique in reducing the execution
time as well as increasing the utilization of the data.
In Figure 6, we show the behavior of PPALM with vary-
ing data size and number of dimensions for the Census dataset.
KL cost increases with data size because KL cost is not nor-
malized. Also increasing number of dimensions decreases
utility due to curse of dimensionality [1]. Regardless of the
data size and dimensionality, KL costs of PDF algorithms
are less than half of that of SPALM. As for efficiency, PPALM
scales well with increasing data size. However, there is a ma-
jor difference in efficiency between executions with 6 and 7
attributes. The reason for this is that the sudden increase in
the number of equivalence classes triggers many additional
calls to Equation 5.
7 Future Work
There remain issues that are not addressed in this paper.
While PPALM increases utility by shifting PDFs of a
SPALM output, they make use of the grouping of SPALM.
A methodology that finds the best grouping within the space
of all PDF anonymizations clearly has potential of provid-
ing even more utilization. One possible algorithm address-
ing this is based on hierarchical clustering. The algorithm
starts with the tuples in PT , each belonging to a separate
cluster. The algorithm then merges close clusters with each
other until in each cluster c, the utility optimal PDF general-
ization of the tuples in c satisfies δ -presence. The closeness
here is measured as the negative KL cost of the generaliza-
tion. The evaluation of such an algorithm is left as future
work.
Storage and utilization of PDF anonymizations require
unconventional database management systems. Fortunately,
uncertainty management in databases is not a new concept,
there has already been systems implemented that provide
support for uncertain data [22]. PDF reconstructions can also
be stored in a conventional database management system.
However, that would harm the utility due to the random na-
ture of the reconstruction. Instead, applications running on
such databases can make better use of PDFs on the software
level while storing the PDF anonymization in multiple ta-
bles (e.g., one table holds ids and sensitive attributes and the
rest hold the PDF functions so that the join is the PDF ano-
nymization.) Experiments in this paper have been conducted
in a similar fashion.
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8 Conclusions
We presented PDF generalizations in which the value gener-
alizations are empowered with probability distributions. We
showed how PDFs can be used to increase utility without
violating the `-diversity and δ -presence privacy constraints.
We also presented several optimizations to make the tech-
nique practical. We proposed two PDF algorithms WPALM
and PPALM to achieve δ -presence. The experiments on real
world data showed that the use of PDFs increases utilization
without violating the privacy constraints.
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A Utility Optimal Distribution
In this section, we prove Theorems 1, 2, and 3.
We focus on the equivalence class EC and derive the optimal dis-
tribution function F : { f1, · · · , fA, fA+1} for QI attributes 1 · · ·A and (if
any) sensitive attribute A+ 1 in EC that will maximize the matching
probability for a pdf anonymization T ∗ of T . Let again cia be the num-
ber of times an atomic data value vi from Da (domain of attribute a)
appears in attribute a of T . Note that for attribute a, the same distribu-
tion fa is used in all tuples of EC. To compact the equations below, we
use notation f ia in place of fa(vi). ; Theorem 1: The matching probabil-








cia · ln f ia (6)
to which we will refer as the KL cost of EC.
Proof Given distribution function F :
⋃
a
fa for the equivalence class
EC, matching probabilityPF is given by
























cia · ln f ia
This is nothing but the negative KL cost given in Equation 1.







for each value vi ∈ Da, maximizes the matching probability for EC.












cia · ln f ia)
Since we assume attribute independence, maximizing matching
probability for each attribute maximizes overall probability. Assuming





cia · ln f ia)
= max
fa
(c1a · ln f 1a + · · ·+ cna−1a · ln f na−1a + cnaa · ln f naa )
= max
fa
(c1a · ln f 1a + · · ·+ cna−1a · ln f na−1a + cnaa · ln(1− f 1a −·· ·− f na−1a ))
Taking the derivatives of the last equation with respect to each














































































Above equality maximizes the matching probability.





utility optimal distribution and let F(1) and F(2) be two other distribu-
tion functions with | f (1)a(vi)− f (o)a(vi)| ≤ | f (2)a(vi)− f (o)a(vi)| for
all attribute a and for all vi ∈ Da thenPF(1) ≥PF(2) .
Proof By Theorem 2 and Definition 10, utility optimal distribution
maximizes the matching probability. Since there is no other root that
makes the derivatives in Equation 7 zero, the matching probability
monotonically decreases as each f ia gets far away from the utility opti-
mal distribution.
B Effects of PDFs on Rule Mining and Classification
Association rule mining is a process of finding binary rules (e.g., ‘M⇒
USA’) that hold frequently in a given dataset (e.g., T ). Frequency is de-
fined in terms of minimum support (percentage of tuples in T that con-
tain M and USA together,P(M∪USA) = 38 ) and confidence (percent-
age of tuples in T containing M that also contain USA,P(USA |M) =
3
4 ). In our methodology, an anonymization is assumed to be success-
ful in terms of rule mining, if the associated reconstruction respects
exactly the same frequent rules as the original dataset does. The suc-
cess is obviously correlated with the probability that the reconstruction
correctly simulates the original dataset.
Let T ∗ be a PDF generalization of T and b(T ′) is a boolean func-
tion that returns 1 iff dataset T ′ respects rule r with minimum support
s and confidence c, then the probability that T R will also respect rule r
is given by
P(b(T R) = 1) =∑
T ′





T R[i][ j]. f (T ′[i][ j]) ·b(T ′)
Since the matching probabilities are higher for utility optimal PDF
anonymizations, the expected rule mining success rate of such anony-
mizations should be at least as good as that of other anonymizations
23
Table 11 Rules holding in table T with s≥ 0.25,c≥ 0.75 and holding
probabilities of the same rules for T ∗n and T ∗p
Rules NDGH:T ∗n PDF:T ∗p
USA⇒M 0.68 0.95
Italy⇒ F 0.68 0.95
Singer⇒ Italy 0.09 0.36
Singer⇒ F 0.41 0.68
M⇒ USA 0.31 0.74
F⇒ Italy 0.31 0.74
Table 12 Probabilities that reconstructed T ∗n and T ∗p will respect rule
‘Italy⇒ >50K’ for different minimum support and confidence
s≥ 0.25 s≥ 0.375
c≥ 0.66 c = 1 c≥ 0.75 c = 1
T ∗n 0.52 0.32 0.12 0.06
T ∗p 0.84 0.52 0.42 0.1
(e.g., NDGH). Table 11 lists the rules holding in T with minimum sup-
port 0.25 and minimum confidence 0.75 along with the probabilities
that the rules apply for the reconstructed NDGH anonymization T ∗n
and PDF anonymization T ∗p . As expected, T ∗p has higher probabilities
for creating the original rules.
It is also not desirable to have false rules (rules that do not hold
frequently in the original dataset) in the reconstructed datasets. It is
stated in [16] that only higher level rules can be mined from overly
generalized single dimensional anonymizations without significant er-
rors (e.g., ‘{Ca, US}⇒M’ will be mined from T ∗n as opposed to ‘US
⇒M’). The reason is that there is no probabilistic way of distinguish-
ing different atomic values of a given generalized value (e.g, for T ∗n ,
if the probability of getting rule ‘US⇒ M’ is 0.68, then the probabil-
ity of getting the false rule ‘Canada ⇒ M’ is also 0.68). This is true
for anonymizations that make use of DGH, interval, or NDGH gener-
alizations [16]. However, PDF anonymizations provide distributions to
differentiate between atomic values. The same problem does not exist
in such anonymizations (e.g., probability that ‘Canada⇒M’ holds for
T ∗p is 0.26, whereas ‘USA⇒M’ holds with 0.95 probability).
The effects of PDFs on classification are very similar because
many classification algorithms basically build models based on rules
of the form {qi1, · · · ,qin}⇒ s where s is a class value (e.g., salary) and
qii are non class values (e.g., sex, job, nation). The more actual class
rules the reconstructed data supports, the more successful it is in terms
of classification. PDFs will have the same probabilistic advantage over
previous generalization types with respect to classification. (in T , rule
‘Italy⇒ >50K’ is a class rule holding with high confidence. Table 12
shows the probabilities that the reconstructions of T ∗n and T ∗p will re-
spect this class rule for various levels of support and confidence. T ∗p
has higher probabilities for each level.)
C The Maximum and Minimum Existence Probabilities
in a given Projected Set
In this section, we prove Theorem 4. To do this, we first prove that
tuples with bigger likelihood probabilities have bigger existence prob-
abilities. This is expected, since likelihood probability for a tuple t can
be thought as the share of t on the sum of existence probabilities in a
given projected set (which is equal to n1).
Theorem 7 Given a likelihood set P = {plow, phigh, p1, · · · , pm} and
the number of present tuples n1, if plow < phigh, then exlow ≤ exhigh.




































































First component of the numerator is negative, the second compo-
nent and the denominator is non-negative. So the difference between
the existence probabilities is non-positive.
Theorem 4: Given a likelihood set P = {pmin, pmax, p1, · · · , pm}
and the number of present tuples n1, let pmin≤ pi≤ pmax for i∈ [1−m].
If exmin ≥ δmin and exmax ≤ δmax then δmin ≤ ex≤ δmax for any ex∈EX .
Proof By Theorem 7, δmin ≤ exmin ≤ exi ≤ exmax ≤ δmax.
D Finding Upper and Lower Bounds on Max and Min
Existence Probabilities in a given Projected Set
In this section, we prove Theorem 5. We first show that if the likeli-
hood probability of a tuple is increased, its existence probability also
increases (or does not change) and the existence probabilities for the
rest of the tuples decrease (or do not change).
Theorem 8 Given the number of present tuples n1, let P1 = {plow, p11,
· · · , p1m} and P2 = {phigh, p21, · · · , p2m} be two likelihood sets with plow <
phigh and p1i = p
2
i for all i ∈ [1−m], then we have the following rela-
tions between the existence probabilities;
1. exlow ≤ exhigh
2. ex1i ≥ ex2i for all i ∈ [1−m].
Proof We first prove item 1. The difference between the existence

























































Since C1 and C2 are non-negative, we have;










We now prove item 2. The difference between the existence prob-
abilities ex1i and ex
2
i for any possible i is given by;





















































































The denominator is definitely positive.The first additive compo-
nent of the numerator is positive by the assumption. We now prove
the second component (C3C2 −C1C4) is also positive. Setting P′ =
P1 − phigh − p1i , P′′ = P1 − phigh; C1C4 and C2C3 can be written as
the summation of likelihood products;
C1C4 = p1i · ∑
{pr11 ,··· ,pr1n1−2}⊂P
′ ,
{pr41 ,··· ,pr4n1 }⊂P′′
(pr11 · · · pr1n1−2) · (pr41 · · · pr4n1 )





(pr21 · · · pr2n1−1) · (pr31 · · · pr3n1−1)
Let, without loss of generality, in all the additive terms of C1C4,
pr4n1 6= pr1j for all j ∈ [1 · · ·n1− 2] and pr4n1 6= p1i . Any additive term
(pr11 · · · pr1n1−2) ·(pr41 · · · pr4n1−1 · pr4n1 ) of C1C4 also exists as an additive
term in C2C3 as (pr11 · · · pr1n1−2 · pr4n1 ) · (pr41 · · · pr4n1−1). It can easily be
proved that C2C3 has more additive terms than C1C4. So C2C3−C1C4
is also non-negative.
Theorem 8 also implies that if the likelihood probability of a tu-
ple is decreased, its existence probability also decreases (or does not
change) and the existence probabilities for the rest of the tuples in-
crease (or do not change).
Theorem 5: Given the number of present tuples n1, likelihood sets
P,P↓,P↑, and their corresponding existence sets EX ,EX↓,EX↑;
δmin ≤ ex ≤ δmax for any ex ∈ EX if δmin ≤ (ex↓)min and (ex↑)max ≤
δmax.
Proof By Theorem 4, δmin ≤ ex≤ δmax for any ex∈EX ; if δmin ≤ exmin
and exmax ≤ δmax. By Theorem 8 and the assumption, δmin ≤ (ex↓)min ≤
exmin. Again by Theorem 8, exmax ≤ (ex↑)max ≤ δmax.
E Minimality Attack on Optimal `-Diverse
Anatomizations
As mentioned in Section 2.2, given an existential certainty model and
a fixed set of equivalence classes, releasing anatomizations instead of
anonymizations preserves the QI attributes thus increases the utility
of data. However, disclosing the exact QI attributes enables attack-
ers to perform minimality attacks on optimal `-diverse groupings (e.g.,
groups formed by similar tuples).
Table 13 T is a private table, Tσ is a copy of T on QI attributes but with
different class assignments. T a and T aσ are cost optimal 1.5-diverse
















two c1, one c2t2 18
t3 49
t4 51 one c1, one c2t5 51
Age Class
t1 18 one c1, one c2t2 18
t3 49
two c1, one c2t4 51
t5 51
T a T aσ
As an example, suppose in Table 13, T a is released as the opti-
mal anatomization of private table T . An adversary knowing that the
anonymization algorithm tries to cluster similar tuples derives the fol-
lowing conclusion. t3 is grouped with t1 and t2 even if it is closer to
t4 and t5. That means t1 and t2 should have the same sensitive value
c1. (Otherwise, the data owner would release T aσ with a better grouping
instead of T a.) Thus the adversary discovers the sensitive values for
tuples t1, t2, and t3; even if the released dataset is 1.5-diverse.
